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The Significance of European Administrative 
Soft Law for the Implementation of ESI Funds 
in the Member States 
Jacobine van den Brink* 
In the implementation of European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI Funds) the Euro-
pean Commission is increasingly using European administrative soft law. This article ex-
plores the legal effects of this for national authorities, responsible for the implementation 
of European Structural and Investment Funds, and national courts, confronted with disputes 
in this area. The central issue in this paper is: how to consider these legal effects, especial-
ly in the light of flexibility, legality, legal certainty, and transparency? 
I. Introduction 
The implementation of European Structural and In-
vestment Funds is not only governed by European 
regulations (so-called hard law). The European Com-
mission also steers the implementation of policy by 
Member States through soft law. European adminis-
trative soft law 1•2 involves rules and guidance to na-
tional authorities on the proper interpretation, trans-
position, application, and enforcement of existing 
EU law. 3 This can include working documents, guide-
lines and communications. 
Unlike EU legal instruments, soft law is not legal-
ly binding.4•5 This is confirmed by the standard dis-
claimer that the text concerned is without prejudice 
to any further position taken by the Commission or 
judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Nev-
D r. J.E . van den Brink is assistant pro fessor and researcher Consti-
tutional and Administrative Law at Lei den Universi ty. As from 1 
july 201 6 she is appointed as a full professor European and 
national adm inistrative law at Maastricht University. 
The b roader term ' European soft law' covers preparatory and 
informative instruments published by the Commission, I ike Green 
Papers, White Papers and action programmes. 
See L.A.J . Send en Soft Law in European Community Law (diss. 
Tilburg) (Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004) 
p . 12 3 et seq. 
L. Senden Soft Post-Legislative Rulemaking . A Time for More 
Stringent Control (2013) ELJ 19, pp. 57-75, p . 57. 
4 Seefn. 3,p. 62 . 
5 H . C.H . Hofmann, G. C. Rowe, A. H. TUrk Administrative Law 
and Policy of the European Union (Oxford : Oxford University 
Press, 201 1) p. 571 . 
C. van Dam EU Administrative Soft Law and the Separation of 
Powers in: Hans-Martien ten Napel & W im Voermans (ed.) The 
ertheless, soft law can have legal effects,6,7,s,9 and af-
fect the rights and obligations of actors, such as the 
Commission, Member States and beneficiaries of the 
Eu b .d. 101112 F 1 · 1 h -su s1 1es. ' ' or examp e, natwna aut on-
ties who grant subsidies through ESI Funds use soft 
law to decide whether a subsidy is compliant. Euro-
pean soft law therefore affects how ESI Funds are 
implemented and what beneficiaries receive. 
This article explores the legal effects of European 
administrative soft law (hereafter: European soft law 
or soft law) for national authorities involved in the 
implementation of ESI Funds, and national courts, 
confronted with related disputes. The main aim is to 
appraise these effects in the light of issues of flexi-
bility, legality, legal certainty, and transparency. 
This article is structured as follows. First the phe-
nomenon of European soft law is briefly discussed 
Powers That Be. Rethinking the Separation of Powers, A Leiden 
Response to Moilers (Leiden: Leiden Univers ity Press, 201 5) 
pp. 191-21 3, p . 193. 
7 Seefn. 3,p. 62-63. 
8 0 . Stefan Soft Law in Court. Competition Law, State Aid and the 
Court of justice of the European Union (A lphen aan den Rij n: 
Kluwer Law International, 2012) p . 15-16. 
9 See fn. 5, p . 571. 
10 A variation on the defi nition given by Stefan. See fn. 8, p. 15-16. 
11 See also T. Hartley The Fwndations of European Union law: an 
introduction to the constitutional and administrative law of the 
European Union (Oxford: OUP, 201 0) p . 354. 
12 F. Snyder Interinstitutional Agreements: Forms and Constitutional 
Limitations in: C . Winter (ed .), Sources and Categories of Euro-
pean Union Law A Comparative and Reform Perspective 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996) pp. 453 -466, 
p. 463. 
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(section II). Second, section III reviews how, accord-
ing to the ECJ, national authorities and courts should 
deal with soft law. Third, these findings are compared 
to Dutch implementation practice (section IV). 
Fourth, consideration is given to the pros and cons 
of soft law in the implementation of ESI Funds (sec-
tion V). Finally, some conclusions are drawn (section 
VI). This article argues that soft law offers flexibili-
ty to the Commission and national authorities, but 
its disadvantages in relation to issues of legality and 
legal certainty should not be underestimated. 
II. European Soft Law in the Field of ESI 
Funds 
European soft law takes various forms: working doc-
uments, 13 communications, 14 guidance notes, 15 ref-
erence guides,16 or guidelines. 17 Many authors have 
tried to categorise these documents. 18 For the pur-
pose of this article, it is important to distinguish in-
terpretative soft law from decisional soft law. Using 
interpretative instruments the Commission indicates 
how existing EU law provisions should be under-
stood and applied. 19 Through compromises, EU law 
contains provisions open to various interpretations . 
Although in theory only the ECJ can hand down legal-
ly binding interpretations of EU law, in practice na-
tional authorities first and foremost apply EU law. 
National authorities interpreting provisions in differ-
ent ways threaten an effective and uniform applica-
tion of EU law. Laying down a certain interpretation 
in soft law, the Commission attempts to achieve the 
13 See working documen t AGRI/60363/2005-REV1, On -the-spot 
checks o f area according to articles 23 -32 of Commission Regula-
tion 765/2004, G:\AA \ WD\60363 REV1 -Final. 
14 See the Communication from the Commission on the application 
o f the European Union State aid ru les to compensation granted 
for the provision of services of general economic interest, OJ 
2012 c 814. 
15 See the Revised Guidance Note on Financial Engineering Instru-
ments under Article 44 of Counci I Regulation 1083/2006, CO-
COF _1 0-001 4-05-EN. 
1 6 Financial instruments in ESI F programmes 2014-2020, A short 
reference guide for Managing Authoriti es, Ref. 
Ares(2014)2 195942 - 02/07/2014. 
1 7 Gu idelines on fi nancial correcti ons for expenditure financed by 
the Union under shared management, for non-compliance w ith 
the rules on publ ic procurement, Annex to the Commission 
Decision o f 19.12.2013 on the setting out and approval of the 
guidelines for determining financial corrections to be made by 
the Commission to expenditure fi nanced by the Union, C(2013) 
9527 final. 
uniform interpretation of EU law in Member 
States.20 In practice, Member States often ask the 
Commission to clarify European legal instruments; 
without soft law "they would be stumbling in the 
dark". 21 An example of an interpretative soft law in-
strument on ESI Funds is the Guidance for Member 
States on Article 41 Common Provision Regulation 
(CPR) -Requests for payment.22 Here the Commis-
sion explains the introduction of phased applications 
for interim payments to prevent excessive upfront 
payment of European Investment Funds to financial 
instruments. 
In decisional instruments, the Commission indi-
cates how it will apply EU law in individual cases, 
where it has been given an implementing, discre-
tionary power.23 One example concerning ESI Funds 
are the guidelines for determining financial correc-
tions to expenditure co-financed by the EU under the 
Structural Funds and European Fisheries Fund for 
non-compliance with the rules applicable to finan-
cial engineering instruments.24 These apply to the 
Commission in its relationship with Member States 
where expenditure concerning financial instruments 
are deemed irregular and have not been corrected by 
the Member State. However, the guidelines recom-
mend the competent national authorities to apply the 
same criteria and rates defined in the guidelines to-
wards beneficiaries, unless they apply stricter stan-
dards. Thus, national authorities will follow the 
guidelines vis-a-vis beneficiaries and pass the finan-
cial corrections on to them. 
Soft law on ESI Funds is usually discussed in an 
expert committee - the EGESIF,25 successor to 
18 Seefn. 2. 
19 Seefn. 3, p . 60. 
20 H. Adam Die Mitteilungen der Kommission: Verwa/tungsvorschriften 
des Europaischen Cemeinschaftsrechts? fine Untersuchung zur 
rechtsdogmatischen Einordnung eines Instruments der Kommission 
zur Steuerung der DurchfUhrung des Cemeinschaftsrechts (Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999) p. 71-72 . 
21 See fn. 5, p . 570. 
22 EGESIF _15-0006-01, 08/06/201 5. 
23 See fn. 3, p . 60. 
24 EGESIF _14-00015, 06/06/2014. See <http://ec.europa.eu/regi onal 
_,pol icy/sources/docgener/i nformat/2014/guideli nes_financial 
_corrections.pdf>. 
25 Group of Experts in Structural and Investment Funds (EGESIF). 
EGESI F deals wi th delegated acts, guidelines and o ther docu-
ments from the Commission. There is also a Coordination Com-
mittee for European Structural and Investment Funds w here the 
Implementation acts are f irst dealt w ith (comitology). 
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COCOF26 - which consists of representatives of the 
Member States. Usually the soft law is put to Mem-
ber States and/or the Commission. After adoption, 
the soft law is communicated to the national author-
ities and published on the DG REGIO website. Soft 
law, however, is not always published in the EU Of-
ficial Journal. 27·28 Sometimes - at least with agricul-
tural subsidies - a soft law document is known only 
to the Commission and the national authoritie s. 
Ill. The Significance of European Soft 
Law for National Authorities and 
Courts According to the ECJ 
1. National Authorities 
European soft law is not legally binding, so national 
authorities are not obliged to implement European 
subsidy schemes in accordance with such docu-
ments. Article 291 TFEU requires Member States to 
adopt all measures of national law necessary to im-
plement legally binding Union acts.29 In addition, 
the principle of loyal cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU 
- though formulated more broadly than Article 291 
-does not oblige Member States to act in accordance 
with EU soft law. 30·31·32·33 Thus, no obligation exists 
for national authorities to implement European soft 
law.34 They are however competent to implem ent 
26 The Committee of the Coordinati on of Fun ds (COCOF). 
2 7 T. Crop Exekutive Vollzugsprogammierung durch tertiares Cemein-
schaftsrecht? (D ie O ffent liche Verwal tung, 2004) pp. 20-26, p. 21. 
28 See fn. 20, p. 63 1. 
29 ) . Lui;endijk, L.A .). Senden Oe gelaagde doorwerking van Eu-
ropese administratieve soft law in de nationale rech tsorde (2011 ) 
SEW, pp. 312-352, p. 329 . 
30 See fn. 3, p . 190. 
31 A. Sanchez Graells Soft Law and the Private Enforcement of the 
EU Competition Rules (paper presented at the International Con-
ference on the Private Enforcement of Competi tion Law, U niversi-
ty ofValladodid, 14-1 5 October 2010 <http ://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstracUd= 1 639851 >) p. 9-1 0 . 
32 S. Thomas Die Bindungswirkung von Mitteillungen, Bekannt-
machungen und Leitlinien der EC-Kommission (EuR, 2009) 
p. 423-443' p . 435; 
33 See fn. 2, p.443. 
34 See fn. 2, p . 35 1 et seq. See Case 229/86, Brother Industries, 
[1987] ECR 3757. 
35 Case T-113/89, Nefarma, [1990] ECR 11-797. See also fn. 2, 
p. 348. 
36 See fn. 32, p. 432-433. 
37 See fn. 32, p. 428-429. 
soft law in their national legal orders. 35 In that case 
national authorities are bound to soft law by virtue 
of the national law. 36 
(Indirect) Legal Effects of European Soft Law 
Under EU law soft law can actually have (indirect) 
legal effects on national authorities, even if new oblig-
ations are contained in soft law. An important pre-
liminary condition is that soft law can only have le-
gal effect when in line with EU hard law.37·38·39·40·41 
Furthermore, soft law cannot deviate from the ECJ's 
case law.42 
One possibility is that an EU Treaty or regulation 
states that soft law is legally binding. This was at is-
sue for instance in the Generics ruling where the an-
nex to a directive stated that the Commission guide-
lines must be taken into account.43 
Secondly, agreement can exist between the Com-
mission and Member States or national authorities 
concerned the soft law.44 The document itself does 
not have to state this. Soft law can ar ise from nego-
tiations between the Commission and Member 
States, without making this explicitly clear.45·46 For 
soft law to have any leg al force, according to Senden, 
a legal basis in primary or secondary EU law must 
exist either specifically providing for the assumption 
of such 'ag reed' acts,47 or a special obligation to co-
operate .48 The Ifssel-Vliet ruling dealt with how far 
38 E. Korkea-Aho EU soft law in domestic legal systems . flexibility 
and diversity guaranteed2 (MJ 2009) pp. 271-290, p . 279, foot-
note 27 . 
39 O .A. ;>tefan European Competition Soft Law in European Courts: 
A Matter of H ard Principles? (ELJ 2008) pp. 753-772, p. 764. 
40 See fn. 2, p. 243 et seq . 
41 See also Case C-464/09/P, Holland Malt BV, [201 0) ECR 1-12443. 
42 See fn. 39, p. 764; see fn. 2, p . 373. 
43 Case C-368/96, Generics, [1998) ECR 1-7967 . 
44 See fn. 3,p. 272 . 
45 Apparent during interviews as part of my PhD research (j.E. van 
den Bri nk, Oe uitvoering van Europese subsidieregelingen in 
Nederland juridische knelp unten en uitdagingen, Deventer: 
Kluwer 201 2) wi th representatives o f the Commission, the Euro-
pean Court o f Audi tors and Dutch authorities charged w ith the 
grant ing of European subsidies. 
46 See also ). Klabbers Informal instruments before the European 
Court of justice ( CMLRev 1994) pp. 99 7-1 02 3, p. 1 01 2. 
47 See Case C-303/90, France/Commission, [199 1) ECR 1-53 15; 
Case C-325/91, France/Commission, [1993) ECR 1-3283, in which 
such a legal basis was not provided for. See also fn. 2, 
p. 272-273 . 
48 See fn. 5, p . 574 et seq. 
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Member States can be bound to soft law through a 
special obligation to cooperate.49 It concerned the sig-
nificance of guidelines drawn up by the Commission 
on how it will use its discretion within the frame-
work of State aid law. The ECJ concludes that the 
Member State is obliged to apply Commission soft 
law, since in accordance with Article 93(1)EEC (now 
Article 107(1) TFEU) an cooperation obligation exists 
for the Commission and Member States and it is ap-
parent that the Member State has accepted the soft 
law in question.50 In the Germany/Commission rul-
ing, the acceptance by the Member State exists since 
it had taken part in the procedure for the adoption 
of the guidelines and had approved them, which it 
did not dispute. 51 This has now been codified in Ar-
ticle 23(1) of Regulation No 2015/1588 of the Coun-
cil.52 So in State aid cases soft law is legally binding 
upon Member States following their agreement. 5 3 
To what extent can the case law in State aid cases 
be applied to the implementation of ESI Funds? The 
regulations of previous programme periods con-
tained a principle of partnership requiring the coop-
eration of the Commission and Member States. 54 As 
a result, the requirement of a special cooperation 
obligation seemed to be complied with. The princi-
ple of partnership, however, has been rephrased in 
Regulation 1303/2013 (CPR) and is now limited to the 
49 Case C-3 11/94, l jssei-VIiet, [1 996] ECR 1-5023. See fn. 20, 
pp. 109-11 0. 
50 See fn. 32, p. 433-434. 
51 Case C-288/96, Germany/Commission, [2000] ECR 1-8237. 
52 OJ 2015, L 248/1. 
53 Member States are not obliged to agree wi th soft law concerning 
State aid: JOined cases T-132/96 and T-143/96, Freistaat Sachs en 
and Volkswagen/ Commission, [1 999] ECR 11-3 663, Case 
C-292/95, Spain/Commission, [1 997] ECR 1-193 1. 
54 Art. 11 of Reg. 1 083/ 2006 . 
55 Art. 59 o f Reg. 966/2014. 
56 Apparent from aforementioned interviews; although these inter-
views took p lace in the COCOF-period I assume this has not 
changed. A soft law document arising through consultation with 
M ember States, is apparent to ESI Funds if it concerns an EGESIF 
(or before 2014 a COCO F) document. Such documents do not 
show Member States approved the document. 
57 J. Klabbers The undesirability of soft law (1998) Nordic journal of 
International law, pp. 381-391, p. 389 . 
58 Case 322/88, Grimaldi, [1989] ECR 4407; jo ined cases C-317/08-
C-320/08, Alassin i et a/.!SpA, [201 0] ECR 22 13. 
59 See fn. 2, p. 387; see fn. 32 , p. 437-43 8;Case T-549/08, Luxem-
bourg/Commission, [2010] ECR 11-2477 . 
60 See fn. 2, p . 38 7. 
61 See fn. 29, p. 33 5. 
62 See fn. 3, p. 62; see fn. 2, p. 389 et sec. 
relationship between the Member State and its com-
petent regional and local authorities. Although the 
ECJ may deduce a special obligation to cooperate 
from the simple fact that ESI Funds are implement-
ed under shared management55 between the Com-
mission and Member States, this is far from sure. 
Moreover, it must be apparent that the Member 
State has accepted the soft law. Must there be express 
agreement, or is it sufficient if it appears that the 
Member State applies the soft law in practice? As al-
ready mentioned, within the framework of ESI 
Funds, through the EGESIF Member States take part 
in the procedure for the adoption of the soft law. Of-
ten, representatives of the Member States approve 
the soft law. 56 From the above examples, it might be 
derived that in European subsidy cases the ECJ will 
also rule that for a Member State to be bound to soft 
law, it must give explicit approval. 57 The mere appli-
cation of soft law seems insufficient. After all, it is 
possible that in the EGESIF where the soft law was 
discussed the Member State had explicitly indicated 
its disagreement, but - with majority agreement -
the soft law was eventually applied by the particular 
Member State anyway. But until now there has been 
no European case law on this issue. 
In conclusion, it is doubtful therefore whether the 
case law concerning the significance of soft law for 
national authorities in State aid issues also applies to 
the implementation of ESI Funds. 
2. National Courts 
This section will consider how national courts should 
deal with European soft law based on the ECJ's case 
law. In Grimaldi the Court decided that recommen-
dations can play an important role as an interpreta-
tion aid, and should be taken into account by 
national courts. 58 This raises a number of questions. 
Does Grimaldi imply that national courts are merely 
obliged to take recommendations into account if they 
can contribute to clarifying European law or nation-
al law to implement it?59 Soft law must then merely 
be considered a mandatory interpretation aid. Or did 
the Court mean that national courts are obliged to in-
terpret national law in conformity with recommen-
dations ?60 With regard to soft law which establishes 
that national authorities are obliged to comply with 
it, the second view prevails. 51 For other soft law, the 
first view must be assumed. 52 After all, soft law has 
6 1 The Significance of European Administrative Soft Law EStiF 1[2016 
no priority over national law, no direct effect in the 
national legal order or priority over primary and sec-
ondary EU law, since soft law cannot deviate from 
this.63 
In other cases the ECJ chooses another approach 
route. In the Kreusslercase for example the ECJ states 
that the national court may take account of that doc-
ument. 54 Contrary to Grimaldi it leaves room for the 
national court to set aside the guidance. 
Another question is whether Grimaldi requires na-
tional courts to consider recommendations ex officio. 
In Grimaldi it appears Grimaldi himself had relied 
on the recommendation. No clear obligation seems 
to exist for national courts to consider soft law 
ex officio, in view of the Court's opinion that nation-
al courts are not obliged to apply EU law ex officio 
without the power to do so according to national 
law. 65 A different view would mean that in every case 
pertaining to EU law, national courts must examine 
the extent to which soft law applies. This is almost 
impossible, since much soft law has not been pub-
lished. The ECJ has not yet given an explicit ruling 
on an obligation for national courts to apply soft law 
ex officio. However, in Mehildinen Oy, the Court con-
sidered ex officio an interpretative communication 
from the Commission in its assessment.66 It remains 
to be seen whether this will have implications about 
obligations for national courts. 
Next, to what extent does Grimaldi apply to other 
soft law instruments besides recommendations? Af-
ter all, recommendations, contrary to communica-
tions or working documents, are explicitly men-
tioned in Article 288 TFEU and are usually published 
in the Official Journal. In Baltlanta, however, the ECJ 
applied the Grimaldi formula by analogy also to Com-
mission guidelines.67 The obligation to take soft law 
into account is thus not limited to just recommenda-
tions. 
The final question is to what extent national 
courts, in deviating from an interpretation of Euro-
pean law endorsed by the Commission through soft 
law, are obliged to ask for a preliminary ruling? The 
ECJ's case law shows that if national courts doubt the 
validity of the soft law, they must ask for a prelimi-
nary ruling.68 It is uncontested that national courts 
may ask for a preliminary ruling about the interpre-
tation of soft law.69 If national courts prefer a 
different interpretation than the Commission it usu-
ally indicates that the interpretation of the underly-
ing EU hard law does not concern an acte clair?0 In 
that case, the highest national court is obliged by 
virtue of the Cilfit ruling71 to request a preliminary 
ruling, even if the Commission has adopted soft law. 
However, it is also possible that the soft law cuts no 
ice or is contradictory. If the national court considers 
the EU provision to be clear, there is no need to re-
quire a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of 
the soft law.72 The same applies if the soft law is ev-
idently contrary to the ECJ's case law. However, in 
case there are conflicting decisions from lower courts 
in various Member States concerning the interpreta-
tion of an EU provision, a court, against whose deci-
sions there is no judicial remedy under national law, 
is obliged to request a preliminary ruling.73 I assume 
this also applies where soft law exists on the inter-
pretation of that provision. 
On the basis of the ECJ's case law, it can be con-
cluded that national courts must use European soft 
law as a mandatory interpretation aid. Furthermore, 
national courts may ask preliminary questions con-
cerning the interpretation of soft law. If the underly-
ing EU hard law is unclear, the highest national courts 
must refer a preliminary question to the ECJ. 
IV. Implementation Practice in The 
Netherlands 
In this section the approach of the Dutch authorities 
and courts to soft law on ESI Funds is discussed. Prac-
tice and case law relating to other European subsi-
dies implemented under shared management will al-
so be considered, such as the European Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund (EAGF). Finally, the consequences 
63 See fn. 2, p. 390. 
64 Case C-308/1 1, Kreussler, [2012] ECLI:EU:C:20 12 :548. 
65 joined Cases C-2 22-225/05, Vander Weerd eta!, [2007] ECR 
1-4233 . 
66 CaseC-215/09, Mehilainen Oy, [2010] ECR 1-13749; JOined 
cases C-1 45/08 and C-149/08 Loutraki et a/., [201 0] ECR 1-41 65; 
Case C-196/08, Acoset, [2009] ECR 1-9913. 
67 Case C-410/13, Baltlanta [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2134. 
68 Case C-11 /05, Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods, [2006] ECR 
1-4285; Case C-31 1 /04, Algemene Scheeps Agentuur Dordrecht 
BV, [2 006] ECR 1-609 . See also fn. 29, p. 324. 
69 Case C-137/08, VB Penzugyi Lizing Zrt, [2 0 10] ECR 1-10847. 
70 See fn. 32 , p. 438. 
71 Case 283/8 1 (Cilfit), [1982], p. 3415. 
72 See fn. 32, pp. 438-439. 
73 Case C-1 6011 4 (Ferreira da Silva), [2 015] not yet reported. 
EStiF 112016 The Significance of European Administrative Soft Law ] 7 
of the approach of the Dutch authorities and courts 
for the beneficiaries will be discussed. 
1. National Authorities 
In practice, Dutch authorities that implement ESI 
subsidy schemes are not concerned whether Euro-
pean soft law is legally binding?4 They have other 
reasons to comply with soft law. 
Firstly, to avoid the risk of infraction proceed-
ings?5 After all, the Commission can take the posi-
tion that soft law is merely a reminder of obligations 
under European hard law. Although non-compliance 
with the soft law can in itself not lead to the view 
that the Treaty has been violated, this can occur if 
the Commission and the Eq consider that the result 
is that a hard European standard is not complied 
with. 76 Soft law then acts as an interpretation crite-
rion.77 The Commission can also take the position 
that on account of the special obligation to cooper-
ate, discussed above, the Member State is bound to 
the soft law concerned. 
More importantly, regarding ESI Funds, European 
subsidy paid by national authorities eventually must 
be claimed from the Commission.78 Hence, the Com-
mission has more sticks to wield. Officials of the Com-
74 See fn. 45, p. 288 . 
75 See fn. 2, p . 345.; j. Scott In /ega/limbo: post-legislative guidance 
as a challenge for European Administrative Law (CML Rev 2011 ), 
pp. 329-355, p. 344. 
76 See fn. 29, p. 321. 
77 See fn. 29, p. 32 1. Also Case T-258/06, Germany/Commission, 
[201 0] ECR 11-2027 . 
78 See fn. 45, p. 288 . 
79 See fn. 20, p. 31 an d pp. 124-125 . 
80 Literature refers to a 'chilling effect'. See fn. 20, p. 125; j. Scherer 
Das Rechnungsabsch/ufl.verfahren , Ein instrument zur Durchset-
zung Europaischen Verwaltungsrechts?, (EuR 1986), pp. 52-74, 
p. 73. 
8 1 See fn. 45, p. 289 . 
82 Confirmed in interviews with national authorities. 
83 Apparent from interviews wi th nati onal authorities. See al so fn. 
20, p. 31. 
84 Soft law i nstruments often 'mimic the language and norms of 
formal legal instruments': see fn. 38, p. 28 1. See also K. Arm-
strong, C.Kilpatrick Law, Governance, or New Governance? The 
Challenging Open Method of Coordination (2007) Columbia 
journal of European Law, pp . 649-677, p. 660. 
85 Guidance for on-the-spot checks o f area and area measurement, 
ACRI/603 63/2005-REV1 , p . 4. Note that the " 50-trees rule" in the 
peri od 2014-2020 has been implemented in the European regula-
tions. See Articl e 9(2) o f the Commission Delegated Regulation 
640/2014, 0/2014 L 181/ 48 . 
mission and the European Court of Auditors (ECA) 
take soft law as a starting point to monitor European 
subsidies spent in Member States. The 'comply, or 
explain principle' is applied: as soon as national au-
thorities deviate from EC soft law, the authority in 
question must provide an explanation. If it has no 
answer, it may have to repay the subsidies to the EU/9 
so national authorities are not keen to deviate from 
soft law. If they comply with EC soft law, they have 
no fear of these risks.80 Although in special cases the 
Commission may deviate from the soft law in favour 
of Member States, this requires tough negotiations. 
National authorities also act in accordance with 
soft law because they have requested it themselves.81 
It may not be completely clear to them how Euro-
pean rules are to be interpreted so they are often quite 
happy for the Commission to clarify subsidy legisla-
tion.82 With certainty concerning interpretation of 
subsidy regulations, Member States reduce the 
chance of the Commission finding that expenditure 
is irregular through incorrect interpretation.83 
In addition, soft law often arises in consultation 
with Member States (i.e. in the aforementioned ex-
pert committee EGESIF) so it is not evident that na-
tional authorities would deviate in their interpreta-
tion of it. 
Finally, European soft law mainly contains 'rules' 
very similar to the rules laid down in binding Euro-
pean instruments84 and though these are non-bind-
ing instruments, they offer little flexibility. An exam-
ple offers working document 'On-the-spot checks of 
area according to Articles 23-32 of Commission Reg-
ulation 796/2004', applicable to the single payment 
scheme financed by the EAGF. The payment entitle-
ment for this scheme was based on the number of 
hectares of agricultural land. The working document 
contained a stricter definition of agricultural land 
than in the EU legislation: 'In accordance with Arti-
cle 8(1) of Regulation 796/2004, (forage) areas of trees 
inside an agricultural parcel with density of more 
than so treesjha should, as a general rule, be consid-
ered as ineligible. Exceptions may be envisaged for 
tree classes of mixed-cropping such as for orchards 
and for ecological/environmental reasons. Possible 
exceptions must be defined beforehand by the Mem-
ber States.'85 Although this implies that this rule al-
ready ensues from Article 8(1) of the Commission 
Regulation No 796/2004, it can be understood that 
for the application of area-related aid schemes a par-
cel with trees is considered an agricultural parcel pro-
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vided it is possible to carry out agricultural activities. 
Nevertheless, the responsible Dutch minister applied 
this so-called" so-trees rule" in full to beneficiaries 56 
and decided in 2009 to implement this rule in the 
Dutch implementing regulations.87 The explanatory 
notes to these regulations indicate that the working 
document, although consistently applied by the Com-
mission, is actually not legally binding. For reasons 
of clarity for farmers and the fact that the standard 
can easily be checked, it was decided to incorporate 
it in the Dutch Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) in-
come support scheme 2006.88 By doing so, the soft 
law became legally binding in the Netherlands. 
2. National Courts 
Rulings by Dutch courts confronted with disputes on 
European subsidies differ on the meaning of soft 
law.89 The Council of State seems to consider it legal-
ly binding on national authorities and national 
courts.90 The Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal 
deems it possible that Dutch au thori ties use European 
soft law for Dutch policy. Considering a working doc-
ument containing guidelines on when the submis-
sion of an agricultural subsidy application contains 
obvious errors,91 the Tribunal held that, although the 
document is not binding, the Minister of Agriculture, 
Nature and Food Quality may establish a permanent 
policy line within the scope of European regulations 
on the basis of this and past working documents.92 
However, a ruling by the Trade and Industry Ap-
peals Tr ibunal of 27 October 2010,93 considered it 
problematic that the Minister uses the aforemen-
tioned "so-trees-rule" in a working document of the 
Commission as a mandatory provision when assess-
ing a subsidy application. The Tribunal observes that 
this document is not legally binding. The working 
document cannot restrict the obligation to assess in-
dividually whether a parcel must qualify as agricul-
tural, as is laid down in the EU Regulation. Howev-
er, the Tribunal does not consider whether and to 
what extent the working document is binding upon 
the Dutch Minister. Not a single ground is devoted 
to the extent the Tribunal itself is obliged to use the 
working document of the Commission as a manda-
tory interpretation aid. The judgment of 21 Septem-
ber 2011 shows that the implementation of the 
"so-trees-rule" in Dutch implementing regulations 
did not cause the Tribunal to change its mind. The 
EU Regulation still required an individual assess-
ment of a parcel. It seems that the Tribunal consid-
ers the "so-trees-rule" contrary to EU hard law. If so, 
why did the court not ask the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling? 
3. Consequences for Beneficiaries 
Dutch authorities normally follow the interpretation 
of the Commission in European soft law, primarily 
due to the 'comply, or explain' principle, which also 
has consequences for subsidy applicants and benefi-
ciaries. The application by Dutch authorities of the 
Guidelines on financial corrections in expenditure fi-
nanced by the Union under shared management for 
non-compliance with the rules on public procure-
ment is an example of this. Although this concerns 
the discretionary power granted to the Commission 
to recover European subsidies from Member States 
(decisional soft law), national authorities are recom-
mended to apply similar criteria and rates when cor-
recting irregularities committed by beneficiaries. 
Beneficiaries of ESI Funds are then confronted with 
financial corrections using criteria and rates based 
on soft law. In my view, this is not contrary to the 
principle of legal certainty, although it is preferable 
that beneficiaries realise that Dutch authorities ap-
ply Commission guidelines when correcting irregu-
larities. 
Interpretative administrative soft law addressed 
to the Member State can impact on beneficiaries, 
even without explicit obligations being included. It 
86 Apparent from ruling of the Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals 
Tribunal of 27 October 2010, ECLI:NL :CBB:201 0:802425 and 21 
September 2011 , ECLI:NL:CBB :2011 :BU1249 . 
87 In Art. 21 a (2) CAP income support scheme 2006 . 
88 Dutch O fficial Gazette (Staatscourant) 2009, no. 62. 
89 See on how Dutch admini strative courts deal with European soft 
law J.E. van den Brink & J.C.A. van Dam Neder/andse bestu-
ursrechters en Unierechte/ijke 'be/eidsregels (2014) JBplus, 
pp. 3-27. 
90 Council of State 17 September 2014, ECLI:NL:RVS:2014:3408. 
91 The case law of the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribu nal concerns 
vario us successive work ing documents, such as working docu-
mentACR 49533/2002 of the Commission concerning obvious 
errors wi thin the meaning o f Art. 12 o f Regulation 2419/2001 . 
92 Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal1 2 M arch 2003, 
ECLI :N L :CBB:AF6804. 
93 Trade and Industry Appeals Tri bunal 2 7 October 201 0, 
ECLI:NL:CBB:201 0:802425 and 21 September 2011 , 
ECLI :NL:CBB :2011 :BU1249 . 
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is possible that national authorities are bound to the 
interpretation in the soft law, or consider themselves 
bound to it. For example, agricultural land included 
by beneficiaries may not be deemed eligible for sub-
sidy by national authorities on the basis of soft law. 
This can entail that national authorities decide that 
a European subsidy was wrongly paid. Beneficiaries 
may not be aware of the relevant soft law since it has 
not been officially published. If this merely concerns 
interpreting an existing rule, the question is whether 
they can rely on ignorance. After all, the rules applic-
able to the subsidy relationship between national au-
thorities and beneficiaries often have to be interpret-
ed. There is no reason national authorities cannot use 
the interpretation endorsed by the Commission as 
appears from unpublished soft law. 
The" so-trees rule" judgments of the Trade and In-
dustry Appeals Tribunal show that it is willing to pro-
tect beneficiaries from soft law going beyond Euro-
pean hard law. Beneficiaries welcome the conclusion 
of the Tribunal. After all, the result is that European 
soft law cannot be directly invoked against benefi-
ciaries, preventing them from being faced with an 
unknown interpretation of European law. However, 
problems with the Commission may ensue, as the 
Commission may hold the Netherlands to the 
"so-trees rule" in the working document. If the Dutch 
Minister continues to grant subsidies for such lands, 
this subsidy will possibly not be reimbursed by Eu-
rope. 
V. Advantages and Disadvantages 
It is apparent that in the implementation of Euro-
pean subsidy schemes, the role of European soft law 
94 D. Trubek, P. Cottrel, M. Nance "Soft Law", "Hard Law" and EU 
Integration in: C. de Burca, J. Scott Law en New Governance in 
the EU and the US (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publish-
ing, 2006) pp. 65-94, p. 67 and p. 74; C. d. Cananea Administra-
tion by Guidelines: The Policy Guidelines of the Commission in 
the Field of State Aids in: I. Harden (ed.) State Aid: Community 
Law and Policy (Koln: Bundesanzeiger, 1993) pp. 61-75, p. 67. 
95 See fn. 2, p. 226. 
96 See fn. 29, p. 317-31 8; H. Adam, C. W inter Commission guid -
ance addressed to member state agencies in: C. W inter (red.), 
Sources and Categories of European Union Law, a Comparative 
and Reform Perspective (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsge-
sellschaft , 1996) pp. 629-644, p. 630. 
97 Seefn.29,p. 318. 
98 Ibid. 
99 See fn. 2, p. 226. 
in the Dutch legal order is not clear. While national 
authorities are inclined to follow soft law and even 
implement it into national law, to the Dutch Trade 
and Industry Appeals Tribunal European soft law 
cannot be automatically invoked against beneficia-
ries. Beneficiaries are confronted with decisions 
based on soft law without them being aware of this 
as it has often not been (officially) published. From 
the viewpoint of legal certainty and transparency, it 
is justifiable to ask to what extent the use of soft law 
is desirable. 
1. The Advantages: Flexibility, 
Uniformity and Legal Certainty for 
National Authorities 
Firstly, in both literature and during the interviews 
at the Commission and the ECA, it is often said that 
soft law offers flexibility to the Commission since 
there are no formal requirements on adopting soft 
law.94 These are non-binding instruments and no for-
mal procedure must be followed for its adoption; it 
can easily be created and modified. Especially after 
Lisbon, amending EU legal instruments has become 
very complicated. 
Secondly, soft law is an important aid for nation-
al authorities to interpret standards that are unclear 
or open to interpretation in European subsidy legis-
lation. There is general agreement between Member 
States about the text, but not always about the mean-
ing and scope of European rules95 so no 'explanato-
ry memorandum' is drafted. It is also the case that 
the ECJ- though by virtue of Article 19 EU Treaty its 
rulings are the only authoritative source of interpre-
tation of EU law - can only give a retrospective in-
terpretation of European law, often after long judi-
cial proceedings.96 National authorities cannot ask 
the ECJ to interpret European law.97 Hence, the in-
terpretative authority of the Court does not satisfy 
the needs of national authorities and courts.98 Soft 
law can play an important role in overcoming this 
problem. 
Thirdly, if Member States act in accordance with 
soft law, they can be certain the Commission will not 
start infraction proceedings so it has an important 
preventive effect.99 This can only be welcomed, if 
soft law is in line with prevalent EU law and does not 
impose new standards on Member States (and indi-
rectly on beneficiaries) by means of soft law. The 
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principles of legality and legal certainty entail that 
new obligations should be based on European hard 
law. 
Fourthly, the contribution of soft law to uniformi-
ty regarding the transposition, application and en-
forcement of EU law increases the useful effect of 
European law.1 00 Decisional soft law also enables 
Member States and beneficiaries to anticipate how 
the Commission will apply subsidy legislation in a 
'f' 101 Th' 'b d spec! IC case. IS contn utes to transparency an 
legal certainty and also to the predictability of the 
Commission's actions 102, guaranteeing equal treat-
ment and transparency of individual decision-
making.103 
However, if beneficiaries are not aware that deci-
sions of national authorities are partly based on soft 
law, the increasing legal certainty and transparency 
will not apply to them. Thus, we arrive at the disad-
vantages of using soft law. 
2. The Disadvantages: Conflict with Legal 
Certainty for Beneficiaries and Legality 
As beneficiaries are usually unaware of soft law, its 
use by national authorities implies an infringement 
of legal certainty particularly to the extent that it con-
cerns new obligations. This is trickier if it concerns 
the interpreting of existing legislation. If a rule is 
open to several interpretations, it will not be conclud-
ed that the interpretation of national authorities 
based on unpublished soft law is unreasonable. But 
beneficiaries have been unable to anticipate this in-
terpretation. 
Secondly, soft law lacks democratic legitimacy. 104 
The European Parliament - concerning the soft law 
of the Commission within the framework of the im-
plementation of subsidy legislation- is not fully in-
volved in the adoption.105 Member States are also for-
mally not involved in the adoption of soft law; it is 
usually only discussed in expert committees. It is 
however a small improvement that a representative 
of the European Parliament has now been allowed to 
attend EGESIF meetings.106 
A third disadvantage of soft law is that the Commis-
sion often uses it to formulate new obligations for Mem-
ber States, that do not arise from underlying European 
law or ECJ's case law.107 This can result in illegally im-
posed obligations and is problematic considering insti-
tutional balance, national sovereignty, democratic 
legitimacy and individual legal protection and it is at 
odds with the legality principle.108 
Fourthly, soft law too is often unclear so the con-
tribution to transparency and legal certainty is not 
always guaranteed. 109 
Fifthly, the ECJ can always decide that the inter-
pretation or application laid down in soft law is in-
correct. The fact that national authorities comply 
with soft law is certainly no guarantee that their ac-
tions will be deemed in line with EU law. 110 
Ultimately, soft law does not ensure the uniform 
application of EU law since it is not legally binding 
and it is also unclear what its effect is in the nation-
al legal order. 111 Although national authorities feel 
obliged to follow soft law, national judges can over-
rule this. 
VI. Conclusion: How to Proceed? 
Although soft law is not legally binding for national 
authorities, the implementation practice on ESI 
Funds shows that the Commission assumes that they 
are in pr inciple obliged to comply with soft law. The 
Commission applies the 'comply, or explain' princi-
ple. If national authorities cannot explain deviations 
from soft law, they risk having to repay money to 
Brussels. So they are inclined to comply with soft law 
when exercising discretionary powers and interpret-
ing subsidy legislation. 
100 See fn. 2, p. 226. 
101 Seefn. 29, p. 318. 
102 Case C-3/06, Groupe Danone/Commission, [2007] ECR 1-133 1. 
103 Case C-443/97, Spain /Commission, [2 000] ECR 1-241 5. 
104 See fn . 29, p. 318. 
105 In two resolutions the European Parliament heavily criticised the 
use of soft law by the Commission. See fn. 29, p. 319. See also 
the Resolution of the European Parliament of 4 September 2007 
on institutional and legal implications of the use of 'soft law' 
instr uments (A6-0259/2007) and Resolu tion of 9 February 2010 
on a revised Framework Agreement between the European Parlia-
ment and the Comm ission for the next legislative term (P7-TA 
(201 0)0009). 
106 Minutes of the 1 ''meeting of ECESIF, 27 March 2014. See Rule 
13 of the Communication from the President to the Commission, 
Framework for Commission Expert Croups Horizontal Rules and 
Publ ic Register, ((201 0) 7649 final. 
107 See fn. 29, p. 318; see fn. 2, p. 228. 
108 See fn. 29, p. 319. 
109 See fn. 2, p. 227. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Seefn .29,p. 319 . 
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As a result beneficiaries of ESI subsidies are con-
fronted with soft law. From the viewpoint of legal 
certainty, this is problematic if beneficiaries are un-
aware of this since they will have been unable to an-
ticipate it. It is doubtful whether national courts can 
offer sufficient legal protection. The Grimaldi ruling 
demonstrates that national courts are obliged to use 
soft law as a mandatory interpretation aid. 
To overcome the disadvantages of soft law, it is rec-
ommended that national authorities critically exam-
ine soft law proposed by the Commission and do not 
automatically approve or apply it, in particular if the 
soft law includes rules supplementing existing EU 
law. This concerns new rules that belong in the ESI 
regulations. By withholding approval of soft law, 
Member States will then retain more room for nego-
tiation at the final settlement stage with the Commis-
sion and will have a stronger position in proceedings 
following a financial correction. 
If national authorities consider themselves bound 
to soft law, it is preferable that the Commission 
adopts a flexible attitude to well-reasoned deviations 
to this. The 'comply or explain' principle should be 
applied so that national authorities have flexibility 
which is desirable considering the subsidiarity prin-
ciple. If a provision from ESI regulations can be in-
terpreted and applied in several ways, there should 
be freedom of choice. A Commission which makes it 
extremely difficult or impossible to d eviate from soft 
law in practice strengthens the notion that it should 
have been laid down in legally binding rules. Further-
more, the transparency of soft law for beneficiaries 
should be increased. Although soft law is published 
on the website of DG REGIO, it is far from clear how 
national authorities will deal with it. So preferably 
11 2 Seefn. 29, p . 339. 
soft law is translated into the national subsidy rela-
tionship, though it is incompatible with its nature 
that it is implemented into national laws and regula-
tions. After all, the consequence of this will be that 
European soft law becomes law; precisely not the in-
. . d . 112 tentwn upon 1ts a optwn. 
It is recommended that if national authorities 
want to take account of soft law, they convert it into 
policy rules that are only binding on administrative 
bodies, cannot entail obligations for citizens and can 
be deviated from in special circumstances. A policy 
rule does the most justice to the nature of soft law. 
The increase in the density of rules through the im-
plementation of soft law into policy rules is justified 
by the importance of the legal certainty for benefi-
ciaries. If the rules laid down in soft law are never-
theless applied to them, it is preferable that such rules 
are laid down in instruments that they are aware of. 
Establishing soft law in policy rules also entails that 
national authorities can comply better with obliga-
tions vis-a-vis the Commission. Since soft law will be 
published, it is clear that national authorities will be 
able to use their interpretation towards beneficiaries. 
The aforementioned recommendations try to re-
move the legal uncertainty inherent in the current 
use of soft laws, for both national authorities and 
beneficiaries. Nevertheless, it should be considered 
how the adoption of soft law can be considered less 
necessary. This might be achieved by adopting clear-
er European subsidy legislation in combination with 
the publication of explanatory notes, clarifying its in-
terpretation and objectives. Regrettably, this is not 
expected in the near future. Questions on the impact 
of European administrative soft law in the national 
legal order and the associated issues concerning flex-
ibility on the one hand and legal certainty, trans-
parency and legality on the other hand remain rele-
vant. 
